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Available online xxxxBased on Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action, this paper critiques the transparency and legitimacy of
participatory scenario planning, considering a case study of scenario development for the livestock industry
within Scotland. The paper considers the extent to which the case study approximates the conditions for ‘ideal
speech situations’ and how these conditions could be applied more widely in participatory scenario planning.
The authors explore the rationale for participatory scenario planning within the science–policy interface with
critical reference to the corporate context in which scenario planning has evolved. The aim is to optimise the
potential for its use in the context of socio-technical and environmental governance. Researcher co-reﬂections
on the case study are mapped within a matrix of indices representing conditions for ideal speech situations.
Further analytical categories highlight the extent to which ideal speech was approximated. Although many of the
constraints on achieving ideal speech situations reﬂect intransigent, practical logistics of organising participatory
exercises, our novel approach enables the systematic identiﬁcation of some important issues and provides a concep-
tual framework for understanding how they interrelate that may prove useful to practitioners and theorists alike.
© 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Keywords:
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Habermas1. Introduction
The history of scenario planning coincides with a prominent shift in
governance approaches in western democracies. This shift has been
attributed to a crisis of legitimation surrounding public decision-making
institutions in which the role of traditional knowledge bases is eroding
(Enticott and Franklin, 2009; Hajer, 2003). It is evidenced through the
way democratic governments increasingly seek legitimation for their
policies by commissioning participatory exercises including scenario
planning (for example, Eames and Egmose, 2011). This is particularly
evident in relation to policy around science, technology and environ-
mental management (Attar and Genus, 2014; Wachinger et al., 2014).
Participatory processes and the values behind them are championed
by critics of technocratic approaches (Irwin and Wynne, 1996;
Wynne, 1975, 2008). The participatory research paradigm embraces
local knowledges and promotes bottom-up ownership of data generationgraphical Sciences Group, The
Q, Scotland, UK.
uckett).
Scenario planning as commu
t. Soc. Change (2016), http://dand analysis in opposition to traditional, institutional power centres
(Holland, 2013).
Scenario planning is widely used in participatory exercises and
researchers are often involved in the design and facilitation of stake-
holder workshops (Patel et al., 2007). At the science–policy interface,
where signiﬁcant deployment of this method is currently taking
place (Government Ofﬁce for Science, 2013), its application potentially
intersects with a wider set of democratic values. In order to realize its
potential in the public sphere however, it is argued that, a participatory
engagement needs to respect key normative criteria, including repre-
sentativeness and transparency, to underpin legitimacy (Horlick-Jones
et al., 2007; Rowe and Frewer, 2000). In practice many processes lack
optimal representativeness (Reed et al., 2013), but so long as their com-
position is transparent the public can at least draw inferences about
whose interests are being represented. However, critics maintain that
orthodoxies, institutional power bases and established orders continu-
ally attempt to reassert and reinvent themselves by undermining genu-
ine participation often under the guise of allegedly scientiﬁc modes of
thought (Stirling, 2006, 2008; Wynne, 1975, 2008). Furthermore, the
status quo across Europe remains decidedly non-participatory, leaving
the framing of most science and technology deliberations in the handsnicative action: Lessons from participatory exercises conducted for the
x.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.07.034
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use approaches with technocratic overtones (Chilvers, 2008).
The emergence of scenario planning within the context of science,
technology and environmental management follows decades of
development as a corporate strategy development tool. However,
expectations from participatory exercises undertaken by researchers
to informpolicy extend beyond those associatedwith scenario planning
in the corporate world (Bishop et al., 2007; Flowers, 2003). At the
science–policy interface the researcher is not solely intent upon devel-
oping a corporate strategy, which may stand or fall upon its utility as
determined by institutional decision-makers. Rather, scenario planning
is being used to feed into government policy as part ofwider democratic
decision-making processes. Initiatives like Foresight (the UK Govern-
ment Centre for Horizon Scanning), for example, exist to explore policy
options through projects either directly or indirectly commissioned by
governments and their agencies to “provide strategic options for policy”
(Government Ofﬁce for Science, 2013; see also Foresight, 2008, 2010,
2011). This is not to say that scenario planning for policy makers is nec-
essarily always participatory, nor that valid contexts donot exist for sce-
nario planning outside the public sphere. However, this paper concerns
participatory scenario planning exercises in the public sphere, particu-
larly those that aim to address socio technical and environmental con-
cerns of which there are many (for example Foresight, 2013). In this
context researchers are placed under a special obligation to reﬂect on
the legitimacy of the recommendations or evidence obtained through
themethods that are used. Twoparticular areas thatwe address are:ﬁrst-
ly, problems regarding representativeness (Horlick-Jones et al., 2007;
Irwin, 2006; Blackstock et al., 2015) including unavoidable participant
biases (O'Brien, 2004) and power relations (Attar and Genus, 2014);
and secondly, issues relating to the tools, methods and practices that
inﬂuence the creation of the messages emanating from the process
that need to be critically examined (Irwin and Wynne, 1996; Latour
and Woolgar, 1979; Chilvers, 2008) rather than creating a black box
and masking prevailing orthodoxies under the guise of scientiﬁc neu-
trality (Wynne, 1975). This ‘special obligation’ is an underlying assump-
tion in this research, which is founded in the democratic ethos of
Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action (1984a,b).
The scenario planning literature reveals that a variety of techniques
have entered into use within the science–policy interface (Bishop et al.,
2007) and highlights a wide range of limitations of the scenario planning
approach (e.g. O'Brien, 2004; Wright et al., 2009). We focus on those
concerning the legitimacy of scenario planning methods related to their
use in participatory processes in the public sphere. We recognise that
considerable challenges exist elsewhere, for example regarding relevance
and creativity (see also Alcamo et al., 2006); however, we explore how
scenario planning can act as a policy-enabling participatory process by
identifying some of the issues that potentially erode its legitimacy, and
by taking a critical look at the concerns raised by Rounsevell and
Metzger (2010) regarding deﬁciencies in its robustness. We argue that
there are distinct issues surrounding participatory democracy where
scenario planning is deployed in a societal governance context that
demand greater scrutiny than is necessarily required in the corporate
sphere where much of the methodology has been developed. In
Section 2.2 the paper considers the nature of the differences between
these two contexts and a case is made for a re-appraisal of aspects of
the praxis of participatory scenario planning in the public sphere.
The remaining sections draw on the authors' experiences of a series
of scenario planning exercises involving stakeholder workshops. The
motivation for this paper stems from critical reﬂection of these expe-
riences and a ﬁrm belief that methodological improvements can be
attained in regard to the legitimacy of such processes by drawing
on existing theory in the ﬁeld of discourse ethics, namely work of
the philosopher Habermas. The case study considers the future manage-
ment of livestock disease in Scotland andwas conductedwithin a Scottish
Government funded research programme. Drawing on a critical reading
of Habermas (1984a,b), and in particular his concept of ‘ideal speechPlease cite this article as: Duckett, D.G., et al., Scenario planning as commu
Scottish livestock industry, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2016), http://dsituations’ (see Section 3), general principles for increasing the trans-
parency and legitimacy of participatory scenario planning processes are
explored.
2. The uses of scenario planning
2.1. Scenario planning: the development of an approach to futures thinking
Following Foucault (Foucault, 1972; Foucault and Senellart, 2008)
we approach scenario planning as a process that has been uniquely
shaped by the particularities of its development. The provenance of sce-
nario planning will be considered in this section after brief introductory
remarks. At itsmost basic level the rationale behind scenario planning is
that imagined, potential and possible worlds can help people or organi-
zations to deal with the inherent uncertainty of the future (Börjeson
et al., 2006). Via multiple re-imaginings of the world as it might be,
the scenario planner hopes to inﬂuence current behaviour to act in the
interests of a better future, or at least improve preparedness for imagin-
able adverse eventualities. Based on this general conception, it is clear
that some form of scenario approach has long existed in society.
Creativeminds, fromHieronymus Bosch (c. 1450–1516),whose paintings
are widely interpreted as didactic templates, toWilliamGibson, author of
the novel Neuromancer (1984), have long used imaginaries to inﬂuence
the socio-political landscape. However, as a formal researchmethod, sce-
nario planning emerged in the 1960′s as a tool to support government
planning. An inﬂuential early futurist, Gaston Berger, founded a school
dedicated to the study of possible futures (Godet and Roubelat, 1996).
The rationale of his method is to allow future possibilities to be investi-
gated in a systematicmanner, thus “clarifying present action in the light
of possible and desirable futures” (Durance and Godet, 2010: 1488).
Berger's scenarios, and those developed in the case study below, are
not primarily about the likelihood of what will happen in the future,
but instead provide the opportunity to evaluate a range of different
possible futures, through a combination of “unfettered creativity
with a methodological prospective approach” (De Brabandere and
Iny, 2010: 1508).
More recently, a distinct context for scenario planning has ﬂourished
around socio-technical change andmanagement of environmental issues
in the public sphere (cf. Robinson et al., 2011; Zurek and Henrichs, 2007;
Eames and Egmose, 2011). As mentioned, scenario planning began as an
instrument developed to support public policy, but the processes we see
in evidence today have been signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by two key develop-
ments: ﬁrstly by the expansion of the approach in the corporate world
where it has not required the same emphasis on democratic principles;
and secondly the shift in public policy development away from the
top-down supremacy of experts, preeminent in the era of Berger,
towards at least the aspiration of a more citizen-centric world of
policy generation evident today. However, this latter shift has not
overturned the dominant culture, nor has it necessarily been matched
by a corresponding epistemological orientation of policy makers or
scientists (Wynne, 1975) who, in many instances continue to privilege
expert knowledge, serving to undermine more democratic attempts to
inﬂuence policy. Given the tendency that the dominant culture has to
reinvent itself as it confronts pressure for reform manifest in new
forms of engagement (Wynne, 2002), there is an added incentive to
be critical of approaches claiming to advance democracy through
more participatory governance.
2.2. Corporate planning contexts versus public policy contexts
Concerns about the democratic credentials of participatory scenario
planning were not central to early scenario planners (see Kahn, 1962;
Rounsevell and Metzger, 2010), who sought to inﬂuence policy in an
epoch characterised by greater top-down governance and less public
engagement than the more bottom-up forms (Bevir, 2007) that have
arguably gained ground more recently. What followed these earlynicative action: Lessons from participatory exercises conducted for the
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to an appropriation of a public policy tool by the corporate world where
the requirements for democratic checks and balances have always been
more peripheral drivers of themethodology. A glance at one of the pop-
ular scenario planning guides aimed at business users will conﬁrm that
the pressing problems concern, for example, future proﬁts, increasing
market share, positioning new products, identifying talent and effec-
tively utilizing resources (Wade, 2012). Future-prooﬁng against market
shocks has also been seen as a potential beneﬁt of scenario planning,
and inﬂuenced by this emergent trendmany corporations have adopted
the method (Huss and Honton, 1987; Durance and Godet, 2010;
Ringland, 2006; Rounsevell andMetzger, 2010). By 1981, 75% of Fortune
100 companies reported using some form of scenario planning
(Linneman and Klein, 1983). Variations proliferated including; Two
Axes method, Branch Analysis method, Cone of Plausibility method,
Cause & Effect Scenario Generation, Force Field Analysis, Backcasting,
Morphological Analysis, and Field Anomaly Relaxation (Foresight,
2009). The range and variety is considerable and it falls outside the
scope of the current paper to differentiate between them beyond
commenting that many approaches lend themselves to participatory
exercises with stakeholders. A notable exception, not involving the
sort of stakeholder participation reﬂected uponhere, is quantitative sce-
nario planning (for example Thomas, 2012) which is typically founded
on probabilistic or other mathematical models.
In more recent decades, notably since the 1990s and in the sphere
of socio-technical and environmental governance, scenario planning
has again become a signiﬁcant policy instrument for governments
(Rounsevell and Metzger, 2010). It has, in a sense, come ‘full circle’
in that it has been re-appropriated from its strategic, corporate manage-
ment context by governments, their agencies and related research institu-
tions, to be incorporated in a wide variety of projects at all scales: for
example from the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Carpenter, 2005)
to the Scottish Land Use Strategy regional pilot project (Aberdeenshire
Council, 2014). However, while corporate decision- makers may be satis-
ﬁed to know that strategies emerging from scenario planning exercises
have potential business utility and comply with corporate governance
requirements, the researcher engaged in work directed towards public
policy may have a wider interest in the legitimacy of ﬁndings presented
as originating from participatory stakeholder processes. It is not generally
sufﬁcient, critics argue, for recommendations or strategic guidance
feeding into public policy to originate from a black box (Godet and
Roubelat, 1996). Policy makers need to be conﬁdent that bias is explicit
(Rounsevell and Metzger, 2010) and more widely, following Wynne
(2008) and Stirling (2008), that any constraints thatmay have inﬂuenced
the generation of the ‘evidence’ have been recognised and accounted for
by the researchers. Policy-facing research, especially when it is explicitly
aiming to be participatory, needs to be measured by a different standard
than corporate research, particularly when the research has been
publicly funded, and where it may feed into democratic decision-
making processes.
In response to these concerns, signiﬁcant critical reﬂection has been
directed towards scenario planning with much of it aiming to improve
practice and help researchers achieve outcomes with improved levels
of scientiﬁc credibility. Critics have questioned the predictive power of
scenarios (for example Wright et al., 2009). Other criticisms point to
positivistic assumptions within scenario planning, and have proposed
alternative theoretical perspectives (Chermack and Van Der Merwe,
2003). Wider questions have also been raised about the credibility and
legitimacy of scenario planning at the science–policy interface, where
socio-technical and environmental decision-making occurs (Clark
et al., 2002). Notably, one issue that has been recognised is that the
scenario planning process is necessarily constrained by the worldviews
of the participants whose values and life experiences are an uncontrol-
lable precondition of the engagement that can only be acknowledged
(O'Brien, 2004). Related to this is a concern that information obtained
from elements commonly used in scenario planning, for example,Please cite this article as: Duckett, D.G., et al., Scenario planning as commu
Scottish livestock industry, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2016), http://dPEST (Political, Environmental, Social and Technological) analysis may
produce uncontested knowledge claims, subject to:
“an assumedveracity of obtainedknowledge… [lacking evaluationof]
potential vested interests involved, i.e. little or no consideration of
how ‘knowledge’ is socially constructed according to the knowledge-
originator's beliefs, values and rationalities.” (Wright et al., 2009: 325).
Materials derived from the process, for example, in the formof recom-
mendations to policy makers, can therefore become decontextualized,
with the intermediary steps leading to their production being forgotten
(see also Latour and Woolgar, 1986). It is against the backdrop of such
fundamental issues concerning the legitimacy of participatory scenario
planning that this paper introduces novel thinking based on the Theory
of Communicative Action (Habermas, 1984a, 1984b).3. Communicative action: a theoretical perspective
Communicative Action, in general terms, is a framework for under-
standing and improving society that seeks to identify and remove un-
necessary constraints that stem from the structure of social life
(Phillips, 1994). The scenario planning context is relatively unexplored
through a Habermasian lens, however, there are a number of studies
that have linked Habermas more generally with participatory planning,
for example, Healey (2006); Allmendinger (2009); Taylor (2010), and
Fast (2013). Working in the spatial planning and environmental gover-
nance contexts, these authors have recognised the potential of ‘ideal
speech situations’ developed in The Theory of Communicative Action
(Habermas, 1984a,b) to resolve some of the methodological challenges
with participatory planning. Healey and colleagues advocate a change in
governance ‘culture’ necessary to improve the management of co-
existence in ‘shared spaces’ through enhanced deliberative, collabora-
tive and inclusionary planning processes (Healey, 2006: 297; Hajer
and Wagenaar, 2003; Healey et al., 2003). Both Allmendinger and
Healey have incorporated elements of the Theory of Communicative Ac-
tion (1984a,b) into the development of spatial planning principles.
Other notable applications of the Theory have judged it to be a useful
basis for incorporating normative considerations derived through
stakeholder or citizen engagement into policy and planning processes
(see also Dietz, 1995 (in Renn et al., 1995); Dietz and Pfund 1988;
Stern et al., 1992). Building on this work, this paper considers the
ideal speech situation as a conceptual tool to explore the legitimacy of
participatory scenario planning in the public sphere where the need is
most acute and where the focus of Habermas' critique is centred.
Habermas (1984b) argues that democratic decision making can
only be regarded as legitimate provided it issues from a process of
public deliberation. All political legitimacy, for Habermas, stems
from communicative power, which is in turn generated by public
discourse (Olson, 2011). The organization and execution of that pub-
lic process are predicated upon reason. Reasonableness can only be
presumed when certain generalizable conditions (which we will
introduce shortly) are met. Habermas' ideas concerning legitimation
for the democratic state are founded, following Durkheim, on the
idea of a common will or consensus that can be communicatively
shaped in the public sphere. The more deliberation, critical spirit, and
reﬂection that are attained in this shaping of public affairs, the more
democratic the state becomes. For the state to legitimately govern it
must seek to determine which representations hold good for the
collectivity. In other words, outcomes from communicative processes
must be held to be sufﬁciently representative in order to be founded
on a common will which in turn ensures legitimacy across society.
Furthermore the high degree of consciousness and reﬂection required
by the state, if it is to be democratic, requires it to minimize prejudices
that evade detection through the transparency of the arrangements it
instigates for the discursive formation of a common will (Habermas,
1984b, p.81).nicative action: Lessons from participatory exercises conducted for the
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Table 1
Indices of ideal speech, after Habermas (1984a).
Summary ‘ideal speech’
indices Description
(1) Domination-free • Equal voices — the same chance to speak is
afforded to all;
• Authority based on ‘good argument’ not hierar-
chy — devoid of coercion;
• Allows for criticism and reply.
(2) Free from
strategizing
• Participation with intention to convince universal
audience and/or gain general assent;
• Rationally motivated agreements end disputes;
• Implicit knowledge is theoretically explicit (‘all
cards on the table’);
• Universality: principles transcend speciﬁc loca-
tions and situations.
(3) Deception-free • Absence of self-deception and absence of deception
through participation;
• Trust implicit through assumption of consensus.
(4) Egalitarian • Power relations between participants play no role
in the situation, and only speakers with an equal
chance to employ representative and regulative
speech acts are allowed in the discourse.
(5) Promotes intersub-
jective validity
claims
• Encourages a ‘hypothetical orientation’ and the
shared airing of hypotheses lends itself to inter-
subjective recognition of claims (i.e. exchange and
acceptance of diverse viewpoints).
(6) Recognises different
kinds of evidence
• An open, respectful environment allows a variety of
knowledge claims, different grounds or ways of
backing claims to be brought to the table including
anecdotal evidence.
(7) Constraint-free • No limits on participation (i.e. in terms of numbers,
knowledge types, etc.);
• No force (or exertion of power), except the force
of better argument;
• Better arguments to stand, nothing ruled-out or
ruled-in.
(8) Inclusive • Includes all those who are affected by its decisions.
Anyone who considers his/herself to be potentially
affected by the results of the discourse must have
an equal opportunity to participate.
4 D.G. Duckett et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2016) xxx–xxxHabermas proceeds to establish the conditions underwhich genuine
democratic processes ﬂourish through forms of participatory engage-
ment for the free and fair governance of society. The basic proposition
is that democratic politics involves people determining the rules by
which they will live together and that these rules are established
through political argumentation. Given that argumentation is an
inherently communicative practice and that language implicitly
commits speakers to cooperate through its very structure (Weber,
1904), Habermas bases his entire democratic theory on discourse
(Olson, 2011). Habermas argues that social coordination (or ‘repro-
duction’) and the halting of disruptive social pathologies stem from
communication oriented towards mutual understanding between
actors (Habermas, 1984b; Fast, 2013). He develops a conceptual
framework to reclaim the project of enlightenment, with its values
of truth, critique and rational consensus that have been labelled
transcendental pragmatics, after its opposition to other forms of
pragmatics that propose relativistic notions of truth (Honderich,
1995). The approach is deemed transcendental because of its faith
in the universality of validity claims that are derived through principles
that go over and above speciﬁc locations and situations (Fast, 2013;
Harvey Brown and Goodman, 2001).
At the core of Habermas' value system is the notion of a regulative
‘ideal speech’ situation that allows human emancipationwithin a public
spherewhere citizens can engage in reasoned debate free from coercion
(Honderich, 1995). He supports this construct with an analysis of
discourse focusing on the core components of the pragmatic, reasoned
argument. Habermas proceeds by conceiving of ideal conditions under
which contested validity claims can be supported by good reasons that
can in turn be criticized, leading to mutual understanding (Habermas,
1984a). It is important to note, however, that Habermas explicitly
recognises that his ideal conditions can only be approximated in the
‘real’world, and that the utility of his conceptual guide to emancipatory
argumentation, lies in pragmatically attempting approximation. Speakers
in actual deliberations may be disappointed that the regulative ideal is
generally unattainable, but Habermas interprets this disappointment as
conﬁrmation that we have presupposed the conditions of legitimacy
(Yates, 2011); this presupposition is a central condition in his overall
argument.
Mutual understanding (and ‘Communicative Action’) is therefore
made possible, according to Habermas, through the approximation of
an ‘ideal speech situation’ which entails a number of important condi-
tions: All parties have access to the same informationwith the implication
that relevant implicit knowledge is (in theory) explicit (Harvey Brown
and Goodman, 2001: 206); no relevant argument is excluded or ignored;
and participants' views are based on the rationality of the argument rath-
er than the instrumental steeringmechanisms of ‘status,money or power’
(Habermas, 1976; Harvey Brown and Goodman, 2001). The ideal speech
situation is a space inwhich citizens have the opportunity to freely partic-
ipate in democratic decision-making (Harvey Brown and Goodman,
2001; Allmendinger, 2009). Ideal speech, in Habermas' overall schema,
underpins communicative action. Strategic action, in contrast, involves
the failure of ideal speech whereby interests undermine legitimate
argumentation.
Wynne (1975) emphasizes the potential for Habermas' approach to
help guard against illegitimate distortions produced by the frameworks
of data collection and analysis that subvert genuine public participation
and uphold powerful orthodoxies. The potential for subversion is wide-
ranging and the relevance of Habermas' work to the critical consideration
of frameworks of data collection and analysis used in participatory
processes transcends any speciﬁc point in the policy cycle. Whether the
participation is constituted in the decision-making phase or earlier in
the agenda-setting stages, Habermas' approach aims at the general level
of reaching discursive understanding, is concernedwith the ‘rightfulness’
of reasons, and promotes developing cooperative approaches between
actors based on reason (Habermas, 1984a: 25). While Habermas' prag-
matic approach allows that constraints cannot necessarily be removed,Please cite this article as: Duckett, D.G., et al., Scenario planning as commu
Scottish livestock industry, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2016), http://done of the challenges that this paper takes up is to make them more
explicit using ideal speech to highlight the barriers.
4. Methods
4.1. Theoretical framework development
To illustrate the challenges of achieving objective validity within
participatory scenario planning processes, we use The Theory of
Communicative Action (Habermas, 1984a,b) to reﬂect on a particular
case study of scenario planning in a socio-technical context. Our post-
hoc reﬂection of the scenario planning exercise was guided by indices
drawn from our reading of Habermas' original text through which we
identiﬁed relevant factors associated with the ‘ideal speech situation’.
Care was taken to respect the principle of transcendental pragmatics
whereby our indices would be generalizable. These factors are presented
(in Table 1) as a set of criteria or indices that we used to interpret obsta-
cles to ideal speechwhich appeared to bepresent in our scenario planning
exercise and indeed in other scenario planning experiences that the
authors have participated in. We proceeded by systematically evaluating
individual elements or activities that comprised the case study scenario
planning exercise against the indices. These activities are chronologically
arranged in a matrix (Table 2) and a brief comment is given about the
approximation to an ideal speech situation (as assessed by the
researchers) that was achieved, according to the most relevant indices
(see Table 1). Section 5 presents a more detailed account of some key
ﬁndings in relation to scenario planning as Communicative Action
arranged according to Habermas' triad; process, procedure and product
(see Section 5.1).nicative action: Lessons from participatory exercises conducted for the
x.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.07.034
Table 2
Consideration of scenario workshops and approximation to ideal speech situations; text in italic (column 3) indicates process divergence from ideal speech.
Activities Activity description Ideal speech situation — insights from indices
(1) Participant recruitment
(pre workshop)
Selection including convenience sampling and utilising existing researchers' networks. Opportunity for participants to identify perspectives that were absent was provided (increasing
inclusivity). Emphasis on ‘expert’ and institutional actors (rather than practitioners). Potential for
participant strategizing through self-selection in ﬁnal attendance.
(2) Identifying drivers
(pre workshop)
Pre-preparation of drivers/sheep ‘timeline’ by project team. Pre-selection of industry ‘drivers’ by researchers had potential to inﬂuence ﬁnal selection of drivers in
the workshop.
(3) Introduction to scenario
planning method and
principles
(workshop events)
Introduction to EPIC project, team and individual participants; participant grouping according to
workshop seating plan.
Open introductions (to each other and to method) are inclusive; ‘laying cards on table’, etc.
‘Strategic’ positioning of project members according to seating plan and spatial arrangements may be
considered power balancing (intended) or deceptive (unintended). Power balancing by researchers to
facilitate group activities (i.e. domination by powerful interests/personalities minimised) can also be
an exercise of power by researchers over participants.
Deﬁned rules of engagement as ‘Chatham House Rules’ (i.e.; individuals and afﬁliations not associated
with any comments in proceedings) – no audio recording permitted.
Chatham House Rules removes constraints on free speech, as well as inclusive, equal, no force
other than better argument; promotes need for validity claims.
Anonymity masks contributor's interests: strategic interest can appear as consensus.
Presentation of workshop outline and expectations. Absence of deception in terms of explicit statement of objectives.
Research project remit required research-led agenda, which may be considered unequal and
potentially strategic.
(4) Ranking of drivers by
impact
(workshop event)
Exercise explanation Absence of deception in terms of explicit statement of objectives.
Tension between openness/structured process and power of researchers versus other participants.
‘Dynamic’ plenary to discuss ranking of impact drivers. Inclusive and promotes need for validity claims; promotes development of universal argument
(i.e. agree level of impact of each driver). Participants were given the opportunity to add drivers to
the pre-selected list. A number of drivers were added.
Anonymity can mask contributor's interests and strategic interest can appear as consensus.
Facilitated ranking exercise. Parcelled, timed release of information regarding workshop exercise by the facilitators increased
efﬁciency but reduces transparency and maintains power balance in favour of facilitators/researchers.
‘Reﬂective’ plenary to ﬁnalise ranking. Inclusive; reﬂective (permitting ‘hypothetical attitudes’).
(5) Ranking of drivers by
uncertainty
‘Dynamic’ plenary to discuss ranking of impact drivers Inclusive; relies on validated argument to process discussion (i.e. to combine the drivers – reach
consensus).
Driver pre-selection by researchers may have inﬂuenced ﬁnal workshop selection.
(6) Selection of axes Facilitated discussion of potential scenarios based on axes determined by critical uncertainties Pragmatic facilitation (based on previous workshop experience) limited freedom from domination and
controlled selection of axes and scenario nodes (i.e. whether or not an axis represented a critical
uncertainty).
(7) Generating scenario
narratives/storylines
Small group discussion based on presentation of method, goal of axes, generation of scenario titles, stylised
representation and timeline.
Promotes intention to convince universal audience; also seeks to make knowledge explicit (what we
know about the method, the drivers, axes, etc.).
(8) Closing plenary
(workshop activity)
Description of interim and second workshop activities, including review of participation (i.e.
representation of interests).
Opportunity for participants to identify perspectives that were absent was provided (therefore
increasing inclusivity). Continuation of an open and respectful environment.
(9) Interim activities Project team adds scientiﬁc detail and validation to scenario narratives Participants less able to promote intersubjective validity claims. Intention of researchers to validate
scenario narratives may be considered to balance power in favour of researcher (and scientiﬁc
knowledge).
Scenario narratives document distributed to participants and validation sought about accuracy
(reﬂecting the workshop discussion), plausibility and internal coherence
Making implicit theoretical knowledge explicit and opportunity for ‘criticism and reply’ (rationally
motivated agreement). Scenario narratives conﬁrmed with participants at second workshop.
In practice the method did not result in signiﬁcant interaction between workshops (limited inclusivity).
(10) Presentation of
scenario narratives
(workshop activity)
Review of scenario narratives generated in ﬁrst workshop including development of fourth scenario
narrative
Promotes intention to convince universal audience; also seeks to make knowledge explicit, and
allows criticism and reply. Revisiting scenario space identiﬁed by participants at close of ﬁrst
workshop. Inclusive element to agree fourth scenario.
(11) Scenario
analysis/testing
(workshop activity)
Group exercises designed to challenge and reﬁne scenario narratives, including exercise in which
participants invented scenario relevant newspaper headlines.
Exercises have potential to promote universal arguments through intersubjective validity claims.
Group exercises designed to consider implications of each scenario (‘shock’ and strategy development
exercises'.
Group discussions, where power is equal, promote greater opportunities for individuals to voice
their views and make validity claims.
Potential for researcher-led process to be unequal (i.e. in terms of representation of views).
Group ‘wind-tunnelling’ exercise; 2–3 strategies from each subgroup discussed in plenary. Allows authority based on ‘good argument’ and for criticism and reply, in discussion process (i.e.
to agree effects of measures on scenarios).
(12) Participant evaluation
(post workshop)
Feedback survey distributed to participants to capture participant evaluation of workshop process and
experience.
Opportunity for criticism and reply. Acts to equalise power balance between participants and
facilitators/research team.
Pre-deﬁned survey questionnaire prone to shape responses to expectations and can be unequal.
(continued on next page) 5
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The case study workshops were designed and executed by re-
searchers in the Scottish Government-funded Centre of Expertise on
Animal Disease Outbreaks (known as EPIC) which was, “established
with the overarching purpose of providing high quality advice and anal-
yses on the epidemiology of animal diseases that are important to Scot-
land” (EPIC Action Plan EPIC Directorate, 2012) to policy-makers from
the Animal Health and Welfare Division at the Scottish Government.
EPIC researchers, with invited participants from Scottish Government
and various stakeholders, conducted scenario planning exercises to
think strategically about future disease management in the Scottish
sheep and cattle industries (Boden et al., 2015). By following a conven-
tional set of scenario building exercises, the research team facilitated
the creation of plausible yet imaginative narratives (Shoemaker,
1995) through a series of stakeholder workshops, as outlined in Fig. 1.
The speciﬁc method in the case featured in this paper is normative sce-
nario planning, also known as exploratory scenario planning (Thomas,
2012; Chermack, 2011). Normative scenario planning (see also
Rounsevell and Metzger, 2010; Chermack and Van Der Merwe,
2003; Van Der Heijden, 2005), as used in the case study, featured a
derivative of the widely used Two Axes Method, namely, the hybrid
Three Axes Approach (Mićić, 2005 (cited Gracht, 2008, p127);
Ralston and Wilson, 2006). Given these conventional
features, lessons learned from the case study are presented as having
a useful degree of generality for participatory scenario planning
more widely.
Training was commissioned from a professional facilitator and
involved putting the researchers through a simulated scenario building
process. The trainer was subsequently retained to assist with the
facilitation of a series of workshops bringing direct experience of Fore-
sight (Government Ofﬁce for Science, 2013) and other completed sce-
nario planning projects. Two workshops were held, each comprising
two days of scenario planning with stakeholders. One workshop in
2013 explored the future of the Scottish cattle industry. The second
workshop considered the future of the Scottish sheep industry and
was held in 2014. In both cases the two-day workshops were not run
on consecutive days but separated by several weeks to allow the re-
searchers to conduct interim analyses. The future time horizon for
both industrieswas 2040; a timeframe jointly agreed by the researchers
and policy contacts from Scottish Government. The workshop facilita-
tion was conducted by an interdisciplinary team comprising of two so-
cial scientists, three veterinary epidemiologists and the experienced
trainer, supported by other researchers operating as scribes and
assistingwith presentational, operational and administrative tasks. Par-
ticipants included representatives from the Scottish sheep and cattle
sectors, wider farming representatives, those with interests in land
use, wildlife conservation and forestry, the Scottish Centres of Expertise
on water (CREW) and climate change (CXC), economists, agricultural
and social scientists, veterinarians, epidemiologists, EPIC scientists and
Scottish Government ofﬁcials. Participants were given the role of sce-
nario planners, tasked with engaging in strategic thinking through a se-
ries of conventional scenario planning exercises that resulted in the
creation of four scenarios set in 2040. The focal question addressed
was: What will the Scottish sheep/cattle industry look like in 2040 and
how resilient will it be to livestock disease? (EPIC, 2014; EPIC, 2015) The
question owed its form to the twin concerns of encouraging the devel-
opment of radically different farming future scenarios incorporating
socio-cultural, technological, economical environmental and political
elements (STEEP (see also Political, Economic, Social and Technological
with the acronym PEST)) in order to transcend current thinking but at
the same time to limit the scope of the exercise to factors considered
relevant to the control of livestock disease in Scotland.
The workshop discussions and resulting scenarios formed the basis
for interim reports distributed between workshop events, and ﬁnal
reports written for a policy/non-academic audience (EPIC, 2014; EPIC,nicative action: Lessons from participatory exercises conducted for the
x.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.07.034
Fig. 1. Scenario planning process.
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evaluation questionnaire; the results of which were incorporated into
future workshop planning and processes of researcher co-reﬂection,
reported in the following section. Rich narratives and interesting strate-
gic ideas were obtained and both are described in detail in Boden et al.
(2015). The current paper will not cover the same ground but rather, as
has been set out, will critique the organization and execution of the ex-
ercise in terms of its generalizable characteristics according to the ideal
speech indices in Table 1.Fig. 2. Trinocular framework: Three critical lenses to evaluate
Please cite this article as: Duckett, D.G., et al., Scenario planning as commu
Scottish livestock industry, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2016), http://d4.3. Case study analysis
The data were analysed qualitatively to consider the ways in which
the scenario planning case had approximated ideal speech using tech-
niques of content analysis (for example Krippendorff, 2013) and reﬂec-
tive commentary. A matrix was constructed (Table 2) in order to
present the results, where Columns 1 and 2 represent the different
phases of the process in chronological order and Column 3 includes
subjective assessments of the key issues under investigation, namelythe approximation of ideal speech in scenario planning.
nicative action: Lessons from participatory exercises conducted for the
x.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.07.034
8 D.G. Duckett et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2016) xxx–xxxwhether and how the activity successfully approximated ideal speech
(considering the indices presented in Table 1). The data used to support
the completion of the matrix comprised the EPIC workshop process
design (see Fig. 1), project materials including reports, scribes' notes
and project team comments. An analytical approach, which is explicitly
qualitative, has been followed to stimulate a discussion about the corre-
spondences and divergences between an extant theory and an example
of practice.
5. Results
5.1. Habermas' analytic viewpoints
This section deals in somedetail withwhat are identiﬁed as themost
signiﬁcant items recorded in Table 2. The presentation of results follows
Habermas in deploying three lenses to consider the speciﬁcs of the
stakeholder engagement: process, procedure, and product (see Fig. 2).
Developing the concept of ideal speech situations Habermas delineates
these three viewpoints on argumentative speech which we further
develop to organize our ﬁndings in this section. The “three aspects”
(Habermas, 1984a:25) do not directly map onto the indices in Table 1,
nor do they necessarily relate to one passage of the scenario planning
exercise. The perspectives cut across both and serve to draw-out particu-
lar challenges to legitimacy by looking at the whole from different angles
as they form separate analytic resources for interpreting discourse.
Firstly, Habermas considers argumentation as a process governed by
pragmatic presuppositions on the part of every competent speaker.
These presuppositions are prerequisites to enter into argumentation.
For Habermas, actors must presuppose that reaching a rational
understanding excludes all force, both internal and external, from
the argumentation process, apart from the force of better arguments.
A useful metaphor Habermas invokes is that argumentation in which
reasons for accepting or rejecting claims are advanced cannot avoid
using ‘the voice of reason’ which presupposes the wider emancipatory
project (Habermas, 1991). Furthermore, all motives, beyond the motiva-
tion to cooperatively seek truth, are ideally excluded. He also refers to
this process of argumentation, when it is approximating ‘ideal speech’ as
“reﬂexive continuation”, whereby actors cooperate in good faith free
from constraints, (Habermas, 1984a: 25).
Secondly, Habermas critically views argumentation as a procedure
subject to special rules whereby normative regulation operates to
allow disputants to adopt hypothetical attitudes. For this to succeed,
disputants must be relieved of practical pressures, freed from relying
on their experiences and allowed the space to use tests of reason only,
to assess the claims of their opponents.
Thirdly, Habermas sees argumentation as a vehicle for producing
cogent arguments (or products) that have the power to convince (by
force of argument) dependent on inherent validity claims that can be
refuted (or upheld). These claims are supported by intrinsic components
which Habermas further subdivides into: grounds (or reasons) through
which claims are established; rules or warrants through which grounds
are obtained; and backing from evidence of various kinds which support
the grounds and the rules. This perspective (product) reveals the
underlying components of individual arguments and how they are
interrelated. In doing so it allows insight into how validity claims
are grounded in arguments.
Explaining his triadic approach, Habermas draws a parallel between
his three distinguishing aspects and the Aristotelian canon. He links
rhetoric with process, dialectic with procedure and logic with product.
He proposes that this formal division, which grounds his approach in
the philosophical tradition, reveals different facets of argumentation.
These abstractions serve to allow a nuanced understanding of different
elements of Habermas' theory and we adopt them as an organizing
framework to similarly facilitate a nuanced reading of the case study
in this section. It must be emphasised that Habermas is explicit in
stressing that these three lenses are not discreet categories wherebyPlease cite this article as: Duckett, D.G., et al., Scenario planning as commu
Scottish livestock industry, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2016), http://ddiscourse can be sorted into separate components, but that they are
alternateways of analysing discourse. Correspondingly, there is no strict
division between episodes thatwere enacted in the course of the exercise
and the three perspectives Habermas distinguishes. Each one of the three
modes can be applied to each stage of the public deliberation. Process,
which Habermas discusses in relation to rhetoric, concerns the form of
an argument rather than its content. In particular, the person practiced
in the technique of rhetoric employs a set of processes to persuade an
audience without necessarily holding a corresponding belief in what is
being said (Foucault, 2011). Looking through the lens of process one
therefore seeks to analyse the individual deployment of speech through
which attempts to exert inﬂuence are exercised. To look at process, in
other words, is to consider the strategies, techniques and overall form
with which knowledge claims are advanced. Procedure also relates to
form rather than content, and hence there is a degree of overlap in the
following analysis, however procedure captures the idea of exploring the
coherence of the discursive system that allows us to determine good
and bad forms of reasoning. For our purposes this entails an investigation
of the normative, regulative structure of the scenario planning exercise in
whichwewant to promote ideal speech. For example, exploring the basis
by which researchers exert control as they direct different activities.
Finally product is a lens through which we aim to evaluate the content
produced by the process and the procedure in terms of its association
to evidence or other authority. The expertise, for example, supporting
a particular claim, may be an important factor, or ‘ground’ (Habermas,
1984a) in its argumentative force or validity, particularly when it
comes to persuading a universal audience, therefore a link may need
to be explicit for ideal speech to be better approximated. It is therefore
through this rather formal triadic framework, based on Habermas
(1984a) thatwe seek to identify differentways inwhich the EPIC scenario
planning approximated or fell signiﬁcantly short of ideal speech.
5.2. Process
It may be useful to consider the process lens as one focused on the
unit of analysis of an individual participant attempting to advance
claims in order to shape outcomes of the discursive activity. At this
level there are preconditions necessary to enter into an argumentation
in the ﬁrst place (Habermas, 1984a: 25). Individuals hold worldviews.
These are an unavoidable condition of participatory scenario planning
that the researcher cannot control (O'Brien, 2004) and that condition
the speaker's rhetorical repertoire. The planner is not completely
powerless however. At the planning and recruitment stage (see Table 2,
Activity 1), there is theoretical scope to ensure the inclusion of a wide
range of worldviews by considering individual socio-economic circum-
stances and political afﬁliations.
Habermas' ideal is to include all those who are affected by decisions
that may emerge, directly or indirectly, from the process (Table 1. Index
8). In Habermasian terms, the detachment of those affected fromdecision
inﬂuencing processes is conceived as contributory to ‘the uncoupling of
the system from the lifeworld’ (Habermas, 1984b: 187), a generally unde-
sirable outcome in which human freedom is unnecessarily limited by
social structure. Alcamo et al. (2006) offer the same direction tominimize
partisan strategizing by being more expansive in terms of inclusion.
Against this, the participatory opportunity in any scenario planning pro-
cess is necessarily limited in several ways. First, researchers are subject
to resource constraints that limit both the number of external interests
being invited to participate and the temporal extent of any engagement.
From the outset these constraints are anathema to the ideal speech
situation (see Table 1.). Inclusion in the decision-making process of
those potentially affected by decisions constitutes a normative value
associated with fairness (Rowe and Frewer, 2000; Horlick-Jones et al.,
2007). Temporal limitations, which operate at the individual (process)
and more general (procedure) level, further constrain the opportunity
for rational argument; a commodity that ideally ought not to be a
rationed, ﬁnite resource, but should be sufﬁcient for the task in handnicative action: Lessons from participatory exercises conducted for the
x.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.07.034
1 Axes are treated by the methodology as critical uncertainties that are more important
than others being most likely to deﬁne the way the future will unfold around the focal is-
sue (Garvin and Levesque, 2005).
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requirements that may be compromised.
Second, owing to resource limitations, potential participants are
evaluated and selected on the basis of overt or implied criteria (e.g.
the ability to represent a particular knowledge in the scenario process,
such as speaking credibly on behalf of a group of individuals or body
of scientiﬁc knowledge). These selection criteria represent the potential
to privilege certain types of knowledge (e.g. scientiﬁc over experiential
or professional over practical). The expectations of the funder for
the scenario process may also inﬂuence participant selection (e.g.
emphasising the selection of ‘experts’). It is important to note that there
is no inherent reason why scenario planning should not be undertaken
exclusively by experts, however, in such cases the process might better
be regarded as expert elicitation or some other form of consultancy and
not participatory in the sense discussed here (see also Blackstock et al.,
2015; Kishita et al., 2016). Index4 (egalitarian) speaks to the precondition
of fairly based initial recruitment.
Third, potential participants in scenario processes are limited by
their own individual resource constraints (e.g. the time and skills neces-
sary to participate in these types of exercises), as well as the immediacy
of the topic of scenario planning to their personal andprofessional inter-
ests. There is therefore a degree of self-selection in terms of potential
participant willingness and availability to participate in scenario
processes. In the current case study, the original speciﬁcation from
the project plan had been to assemble key informants and stakeholders
with further referencemade to ‘a panel of experts’. In the early stages of
planning the research a collaborative exercise in stakeholder analysis
was undertaken, which systematically identiﬁed the areas of interest
(rather than speciﬁc individuals) that the researchers considered
appropriate to invite to theworkshops. The interpretation of the research
brief by the researchers resulted in invitations to institutional representa-
tives and professionals (for example veterinarians); potential participants
were identiﬁed and approached on the basis of their ability to fulﬁl
the established criteria (see Table 2, Activity 1). Inevitably, a number of
invitations were declined. Researchers then drew on their professional
networks to recruit a predetermined number of participants, utilising
personal connections to overcome barriers to participation (McKee
et al., 2015), albeit within the parameters of the roles that had been
identiﬁed. Certain groups proved more difﬁcult to recruit than others.
For example, only one representative from the retail sector was success-
fully recruited for the sheepworkshop, and none for the cattle workshop.
The result was that participants mainly comprised representatives of or-
ganisations, professionals (for example veterinarians), other researchers
and ofﬁcials. One consequence of this self-selection was, to some extent,
the participation of ‘the usual suspects’ (Lee and Abbot, 2003), the effect
of which is potentially far reaching and difﬁcult to control for despite
extra efforts that weremade to recruit from groups that initially declined
invitations. These various constraints limit the degree to which index 7
can be satisﬁed.
One technique adopted to broaden participation was to provide the
participants with an opportunity, in the workshop structure, to identify
signiﬁcant additional perspectives that they believed were missing
(see Table 2, Activity 8). At the cattle workshop, participant feedback
highlighted that farmerswere perceived as underrepresented, suggesting
they should be directly involved instead of represented by industry
bodies. During the sheep workshop, at which researchers were able
to achieve greater farmer participation, the participants identiﬁed con-
sumers and retailers as underrepresented groups. One challenge of inte-
grating these groups into the workshop structure of the participatory
scenario process is in enabling integration of the different types of
expertise and knowledge these groups are likely to bring. For example,
policy professionals and organisational representatives are typically
more experienced and therefore conﬁdent in participating in workshop-
type environments (Pinto-Correia et al., 2015). Consumer groups and
retailers are less likely to engage in processes which appear distant from
their primary interests. Participation of these more peripherally engagedPlease cite this article as: Duckett, D.G., et al., Scenario planning as commu
Scottish livestock industry, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2016), http://dor differently skilled groups may thus be limited by self-selection, rather
than researcher intent. Reﬂecting on the scope of the engagement, the
researchers considered that additional validation of outcomes might be
attained via future work with a broader group of stakeholders (see also
Alcamo et al. (2006) and discussed holding activities at both public events
(for example agricultural shows) and at schools.
Another practical way to deal with any imbalance is for the re-
searchers to be transparent regarding participant recruitment strat-
egies, and to ensure that any claims that they make about inclusivity
regarding the scenario planning exercise are carefully considered,
following Habermas' presupposition that truthfulness is integral to
ideal speech (1984b). Further analyses of who is willing to participate
and how power and exclusion operate to shape process outcomes
would also add to the validity of similar exercises (Lee and Abbot,
2003).
5.3. Procedure
To delineate the lens of procedure from those of process and product
it can be considered as relatingmore to theway in which the discursive
interactions (here our stakeholderworkshops) are normatively regulated.
Aswith the logistics determining the composition of participation (con-
sidered above as process), workshop exercises are similarly subject to
practicalities over which the organizers of the scenario exercises, in
this case the researchers, inevitably hold power to structure and deﬁne
the nature of interactions. The facilitated exercises were, in theory,
intended to free the participants from the ordinary constraints of their
immediate environment and individual interests by enabling them to
engage collaboratively in creative scenario building, with no proposal
off-limits and imagination explicitly encouraged. There was, in
Habermasian terms, an intention from researchers to create the
conditions for a hypothetical attitude to ﬂourish (Habermas, 1984a)
and for participants to bring only reasons to bear on each other's claims
(see Table 1. Indices 5 and 6). However before these ideally ‘unfettered’
tasks (De Brabandere and Iny, 2010: 1508) were undertaken the broad
outlines or building blocks of the scenarios were shaped by the
researchers including the pre-selection of a set of drivers (see Table 2,
Activity 2), whichwere used to form the axes and underpin the general
dynamics of the scenarios (Gracht, 2008; Ralston and Wilson, 2006).
Notwithstanding the potential for ideal speech patterns in plenary exer-
cises in which the stakeholders ranked, chose and were encouraged to
add to the list of drivers initially presented to them, the ‘three axes’
method adopted to structure the scenario generation involved the re-
searchers overseeing the selection process which led to the formation
of the three scenario axes1 required by themethod (see Table 2, Activity
6). These interventions were justiﬁed to participants by the researchers
on pragmatic grounds, guided by the most experienced trainer's prior
experience about what would constitute a workable set of axes and
what would lead to completion of the exercise in a timely fashion
(both important considerations). Although the axes selected were gen-
erally in line with the expressed preferences of the participants, in one
instance, a potential choice for one of the axes proposed by the partici-
pants in the sheep workshop, was rejected by the researchers on the
grounds that it had the wrong properties to be an effective axis. The re-
sultant scenarios therefore were not developed around this participant
proposed axis. The speciﬁc proposal in the case study was ‘climate
change’, a driver that was considered in the scenario development,
but one that was not accorded the particular status of an axis.
The intervention by the researchers in the selection of axes (on prag-
matic grounds) reﬂects a power imbalance at play during the interac-
tion driven by the requirements of the method for achieving outcomes
set against the messy characteristics of the visioning ﬁeld. In broadnicative action: Lessons from participatory exercises conducted for the
x.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.07.034
2 This is a convention established to ensure a level of conﬁdentiality. Meetings held un-
der the Chatham House Rule allow participants to freely use information received under
the provision that neither the identity nor the afﬁliation of any other participant may be
revealed outside the conﬁnes of the meeting.
10 D.G. Duckett et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2016) xxx–xxxterms the facilitators can act to shape the scenarios both through prag-
matic pursuit of effective engagement and their own assessments of the
knowledge put forward by participants, consequently inﬂuencing any re-
ports and recommendations that may emerge. While this clearly con-
strains ideal speech, given the inevitable time restrictions and the
unfamiliarity of the scenario process to the participants, a certain imbal-
ance may be unavoidable. Indeed many participatory research and
other workshop exercises, of which scenario planning is no exception,
need to balance the needs of timely completion and production of project
outputs against the concern that the results are artefactual. Further
challenges are introduced by considering participation in simple
terms as ‘human to human interactions through the medium of
language (Webler, 1995:40) for example, managing participant fatigue
(Gramberger et al., 2015). The general point is that this balancing act,
which may be pragmatically justiﬁable, is not necessarily explicit and
may have a bearing on claims about the participatory nature of
outcomes that undermine legitimacy.
Another critical activity conducted in our chosen form of scenario
planning that can be viewed through the lens of ‘procedure’ is the
development of a set of scenario narratives (see Table 2, Activity 7), an
activity which is a central component of the methodology (Mićić (2005
cited Gracht, 2008, p127); Ralston and Wilson, 2006; Schoemaker,
1995). This particular element potentially corresponds with ideal speech
(Table 1. Index 5) in respect of the claim made for the technique to free
scenario planners from their regular ways of thinking through a level of
abstraction inherent in the method (Schoemaker, 1995). Potentially this
imaginative space can act to reduce strategizing and political
manoeuvring. In our experience, the scenarios did appear to live up to
this expectation, often throwing up highly imaginative elements that
did not seem to be contingent upon the interests of the individuals partic-
ipating. Indeed, there seemed to be an intersubjective space created
where the intentionwas to create stories that would convince a universal
audience or gain general assent (see Table 1. Index2). Nonetheless, the fa-
cilitation of narrative generation appears ill-equipped to either recog-
nise or mitigate for participants determined upon ‘gaming’ the
process, particularly anyonewith prior knowledge of themethod intent
on representing a particular interest. In other words, participants with a
strategic interest in telling a particular future story had an opportunity
to do so. In Habermas' terms, strategic action could potentially compete
with Communicative Action, although there is no evidence of any such
activity in the case study. Pragmatically facilitators can attempt to re-
strict the opportunity for participant strategizing by withholding infor-
mation, releasing it stage-by-stage and thereby restricting the time
available for strategic action. There was certainly an element of this
present in the case study as the logic of particular elements, for example
‘windtunnelling’ was explained only immediately prior to the exercise
(see Table 2, Activity 11). However, the down-side of trying to out-
manoeuvre participants are two-fold; ﬁrstly that the researchers can
underestimate the participants who may already know about the intri-
cacies of scenario planning or may ‘catch-on’ quickly; secondly,
allowing the facilitators the upper hand is no closer to the ideal, poten-
tially shaping outcomes in an unequal way lacking legitimacy and jeop-
ardizing Indices 1 and 3 (see Table 1.).
5.4. Product
Product is adopted as a conceptual lens to focus on the arguments or
claims that emerged from the scenario planning exercises in the form of
reports and communications intended for the consumption of Scottish
Government policy teams, and that present a signiﬁcant challenge from
an ideal speech perspective (see Table 2, Activity 13). A major issue con-
cerns the tendency for the claims arising from the exercises to becomede-
tached from supporting evidence and from any warrants that were
originally associated with the force that accompanied their production.
In Habermasian terms the backing for a claim (which is part of the
structure of argumentation and can be made up of different kinds ofPlease cite this article as: Duckett, D.G., et al., Scenario planning as commu
Scottish livestock industry, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2016), http://devidence) needs to be associated with a “problematic utterance” to es-
tablish the validity of the claim (Habermas, 1984a:25). This
detachment is manifest in unsupported claims being present in the sce-
nario narratives, which are in turn present in reports and outputs. In
other words, there is a reiﬁcation of claims present in the scenario nar-
ratives whereby recommendations appear to have emerged from a
‘black box’, with no effective mechanism for establishing who made
them and weak reporting of how they were justiﬁed at the time. It is
therefore possible for the perspectives of dominant participants (or
the facilitators) to feature more strongly in the development of strate-
gies, contrary to the democratic objective of ideal speech (Table 1. par-
ticularly Indices 1 and 4) and for this inﬂuence to be unacknowledged in
outputs.
For example, the scenario narratives themselves and the surrounding
exercises resulted in the development of a number of suggested strategies
that purported to promote resilience in both the cattle and sheep indus-
tries in Scotland (see Table 2, Activities 10 and 11). One key aspect of
that development however, was that the recommendations emerging
from the process are not attributable to the individuals who argued
for them, because of an earlier process decision taken to grant anonym-
ity through ‘ChathamHouse Rules’2 (see Table 2, Activity 3). Within the
workshop this convention for maintaining anonymity aimed to lift
constraints by allowing the participants to speak candidly ‘off the re-
cord’ and to think beyond the established positions of their respective
institutions without fear of sanction. However, in terms of universality
and transparency, something that ideal speech situations intend to fos-
ter, this provision operates tomask the identities of the individuals who
propose and reﬁne the emergent strategies. There is a resulting oppor-
tunity for, ‘strategic action’ (Habermas, 1984b: 86) for example, when
one interest group proposes measures that could hypothetically affect
another interest group not represented at the table. In the case study
therewas an instancewhen changes to the school curriculumwere pro-
posed, in order tomake epidemiology a core subject for school children.
This strategic response to challenges in one of the future scenarios arose
in a small group exercise where no representatives of the educational
systemwere present. Another strategic proposal was the establishment
of an international laboratory in Scotland to undertake research into
livestock disease control. While it is known that researchers were at
the table where this strategy was proposed, the anonymity protocol
agreed at the outset precludes revealing the degrees to which this strat-
egywas pursued or developed by those with a direct interest in research,
industry or policy. The general point is that the presence or absence of
vested interests inﬂuences outcomes (O'Brien, 2004; Rounsevell and
Metzger, 2010;Wright et al., 2009). Subtle inﬂuences can become reiﬁed
in recommendations, claims or agendas derived from scenario process-
es, emerging either implicitly or explicitly, packaged as scientiﬁc
ﬁndings.
To summarise, the inability to attribute any of themeasures proposed
in the case study's outputs to any of the participants falls short of the
transparency demanded of ideal speech, particularly given that the
intended audience is policy makers in the public sphere. Against this,
freeing participants from their outside obligations, which may include
pressures to act strategically, is something that ideal speech encourages.
6. Discussion
At this point, it is important to reiterate that the ideal speech standard
as applied to the case study is explicitly an ideal andnot a test to be passed
or failed. Various commentators have critically noted that ideal speech is
unattainable (Leeuwis, 2000; Allmendinger, 2009; Taylor, 2010; Fast,
2013; McKee et al., 2015). Indeed, Habermas himself allows that thenicative action: Lessons from participatory exercises conducted for the
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the challenges of ensuring that those communicating are ‘equal partners’
(see Allmendinger, 2009), and that strategic considerations do not over-
ride commitments to participation. Research projects, by their nature,
are often predicated on predeﬁned objectives; a remit bias generally
exists in having to deliver to a speciﬁc timeframe and to a customer,
which challenges the Habermasian ideal. Power relations, such as the
power to exclude, are displayed and reinforced both in research and
throughout the public sphere. As Berger and Luckmann (1967): 109)
observe: “Hewho has the bigger stick has the better chance of imposing
his deﬁnitions of reality” (see also Taylor, 2010) and interest groups
often pursue their particular interests highly successfully. Indeed this
recognition of ‘far from ideal’ reality is in fact what drives the whole
Habermasian theory of democracy. Habermas argues that what under-
pins deliberative processes is the presupposition of particular universal
norms, despite the failure of argumentation in a whole array of social
contexts including scenario planning. It is the presupposition by citizens
engaged in the deliberative process that the general norms, represented
here in the indices (see Table 1.), ought to be those that govern demo-
cratic deliberation, ceterus paribus, that motivates further attempts at
Communicative Action (Olson, 2011). Furthermore, it is self-evident
that the presumptively valid general norms cannot always be realized,
because they themselves are not practicable in all circumstances.
Human enterprises, including deliberative processes, are constrained
by resources inways that impact democratic freedoms. Here, Habermas
invokes a ‘principle of appropriateness` (Rehg, 2011). This principle
rests counterfactually on the notion that those affected could accept
the appropriateness of the proposition given that those who actually
took part in the discourse did so free from coercion, having judged the
matter on its merits and in possession of the necessary information.
Therefore, this paper has set out to a way of thinking about the
legitimacy of a method that we acknowledge to be already useful (cf.
Rounsevell and Metzger, 2010), not to propose infeasible conditions.
The utility of bringing the Habermasian framework into the scenario
planning domain lies in promoting the adoption of a particular mind-set
through which better processes can be enacted. Clearly, critical
researchers already question the assumptions that they make when
designing processes, and many if not all the challenges identiﬁed above
are not new to seasoned practitioners however, what the introduction
of Habermasian theory brings is a conceptual framework through which
the various challenges canbe thought of in anholistic and systematicway.
For the case study presented, a degree of success can be claimed for its
execution as a participatory research project. For example, the partici-
pants appeared to have been challenged and enlightened by one
another's perspectives; an assessment supported by the participant's
feedback responses. In addition, social learning appears to have been en-
abled, not least through the creation of new relationships, the develop-
ment of understanding built on trustworthiness, and an appreciation,
indicated by participants in their feedback, of other legitimate viewpoints
(Reed et al., 2010).With regard to research outcomes, the researchers can
also claim, for example, that the participants drawn into the process in-
creased the knowledge-base available to EPIC, that useful inputswere ob-
tained from a range of stakeholders that contributed to more realistic
epidemiologicalmodels beingdeveloped, and that newnetworks and col-
laborations were encouraged by assembling the chosen stakeholders.
These positive research outcomes were the result of the application of a
conventional qualitative scenario methodology (Schoemaker, 1995).
However, these achievements, whilst welcomed from a general research
perspective are not sufﬁcient to be consideredCommunicativeAction, nor
can they ensure that the outcomes generated are free from what
Habermas conceives as Strategic Action (1984b). Habermas is concerned
that various constraints can act to allow the promotion of certain interests
at the expense of others and he is proposing emancipatory approaches
that lead to more democratic decision-making. As such he is keen to dis-
tinguish between participation that encourages debate freed fromunnec-
essary constraint, based more ﬁrmly on reason and other, lessPlease cite this article as: Duckett, D.G., et al., Scenario planning as commu
Scottish livestock industry, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2016), http://demancipatory forms where participants may well challenge one another
and even learn something, but where their arguments are strategic. Our
reﬂection on this particular case suggests that determinations regarding
which engagements resemble Communicative Action and which appear
closer to strategic action are by no means straightforward. In order to
present some of the issues it is possible to identify two distinct ways in
which the indices in Table 1 can guide the scenario planner.
The ﬁrst insight that ideal speech allows is where a comparison be-
tween the indices in Table 1 and a real-world participatory scenario plan-
ning exercise indicates a challenge to legitimacy (i.e. the underlying
assumption being that approximating an ideal speech situation offers
greater legitimacy for participatory exercises in the public sphere).
Aspects of the engagement in the scenario planning case under review,
for example, appear to approximate ideal speech in certain respects and
diverge from it in others, as the preceding analysis has shown.
These binary oppositions are sometimes a challenge, however they can
present a clear opportunity for process improvement even if that simply
amounts to being more explicit about process constraints (for example,
acknowledging how much time was allowed for particular activities).
The logic of the proposed approach is that the utility of the scenario plan-
ning process can be improved by managing known dynamics effectively.
At the simplest level this meansmaximising the degree to which approx-
imation to ideal speech can be achieved,minimising elements that appear
to poorly approximate the ideal, and where reconciliation is problematic,
being explicit about the shortcomings. The controlling inﬂuence of the
researchers in the selection of axes provides a useful example of the issues
involved in managing these dynamics. While the researchers' power to
intervene and shapemany aspects of an engagement limits the egalitarian
basis upon which argumentation ought to be founded for ideal speech
(see Table 1, Index 4), there can be pragmatic justiﬁcations especially
during complex steps in the scenario process. These operational chal-
lenges can be recorded,made explicit in outputs to enhance the participa-
tory credentials of scenario planning. Process improvement for future
axes selection exercises may include providing additional information to
participants and timetabling more time for this activity. The general
principle, across all aspects of scenario planning in the public sphere, is
that the facilitators (in our cases, researchers) are vigilant regarding
unnecessary constraints and committed to reducing themwhere possible.
Themethodological challenges to using this principle to improve process-
es are signiﬁcant with pragmatism repeatedly interrupting the pursuit
of ideals and demanding a high level of sensitivity on the part of
the researcher. While these may not be easy skills to acquire (McKee
et al., 2015) the general principles are usually straightforward.
The second way in which ideal speech can guide participatory
engagement ismore complex and not simply amatter ofweighing binary
oppositions. When considered holistically, particular elements can be
quite reasonably evaluated both positively and negatively against the
ideal speech benchmark. An example of this ambivalence is the question
of participant anonymity under Chatham House rules. While this provi-
sion may have had the intended effect of enabling the participants to
express their views without the fear of organisational censure from
their respective employers, it was a double-edged sword when it came
to presenting participant views to a universal audience from whom
possible self-interest (on the part of both the scenario planners and the
researchers) was effectively concealed. In such cases the solution must
lie in making a determination about which constraints on ideal speech
are more detrimental to the objective of the engagement. In certain con-
texts a failure to guarantee anonymitymight jeopardize any useful contri-
butionswith participants notwilling to expose themselves to institutional
reprimand or under an obligation to refrain from criticism of certain
kinds. A whole range of political, legal, medical and other situations may
require participants to be able to speak ‘off the record’ in order to facilitate
generation of any useful scenarios. Nevertheless, the decision to proceed
with some level of anonymity may impose a limitation, not only on the
transparency of the outcomes but on the overall legitimacy of the exer-
cise. When these signiﬁcant determinations are made we contend thatnicative action: Lessons from participatory exercises conducted for the
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accommodated into the scenario planning in any of the activities repre-
sented in Table 2. When none or few of the indices seem appropriate in
the process we would argue that the engagement does not lay within
the participatory paradigm described in our introduction but may be
better described as some form of expert elicitation. However, there
are clearly matters where participation is considered useful or even es-
sential and it is important to emphasise the inherent danger that
Habermas places on this separation between institutionalized, system-
atized inﬂuences and the broader lifeworld in which human action oc-
curs. For him the democratic governance of society itself is at stake
(Habermas, 1976).7. Conclusion
Habermas highlights the special demands incumbent on the state
to foster rational argumentation in the public sphere as the basis of
democratic governance. His particular contribution in the context of sce-
nario planning is to map the conditions under which claims and counter
claims can be rationalised and freed from unnecessary constraints
which is something that the technique also aspires to. In particular,
when participatory stakeholder engagement is brought into the policy
development arena it demands the highest level of accountability, absent
in parallel exercises conducted in the corporate world, and it is therefore
under a special obligation to be self-critical. While critical reﬂection on
scenario planning is not new, Habermas provides a systematic and
detailed account of discursive practices in the public sphere that allows
a comprehensive exploration of the challenges within a broader social
theory.
We have articulated a number of speciﬁc challenges through a
case study and have shown how scenario planning exercises are so-
cial artefacts that necessarily frame the data they generate in par-
ticular ways. Habermas' theory has been applied to investigate
the extent to which scenario planning processes can transcend
methodological challenges and legitimately contribute to the pub-
lic sphere through approximating ‘ideal speech situations’. This ap-
proach does not provide the practitioner with a blueprint for the
perfect participatory scenario planning process; however, it does
help in the systematic identiﬁcation of the various problems associated
with legitimacy in this context. Habermas' shows uswhere the problem
areas are and perhaps crucially, how they are linked together, and that
knowledge can improve scenario planning in the public sphere. A key
strength of a Habermasian approach is that the democratic principles
underlying ‘ideal speech’ are generally enshrined in shared social
values. An open and critical attitude on the part of the researchers guid-
ed byHabermasian principleswill not only improve the legitimacy of the
outcomes butwill further encourage reﬂection on themethod and reduce
any artefactual issues that may otherwise be obscured by the appearance
of a neutral, objective methodology. More widely, cultural and epistemo-
logical assumptions about the nature of scientiﬁc enquirywill continue to
limit the effectiveness of public engagement exercises, but progress can
be made toward developing scenario planning following the critical ap-
proach discussed here.Acknowledgments
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